Schumpeter thinks of “18^th Century” concepts of democracy (probably mostly pointing to Rousseau) as decision-making processes in which the people themselves decide on political issues by electing representatives who carry out the people’s will.

While others (e.g. Michels) had already attacked the notion that rather the leaders but not the people ultimately decide on political issues, Schumpeter focuses on another underlying assumption of the Classical Theory. He identifies this assumption as the idea that there is a common good to which all people can rationally agree on.

In his criticism, Schumpeter first states that the “common good” is a highly subjective term. Even people with genuinely good intentions will disagree on what exactly the common good is. Thus, it is impossible to find a unanimously acceptable common good. Second, even if people would agree on an end (e.g. health), they are still prone to disagree on the means (e.g. using vaccine or not, p. 252). Third, Schumpeter denies that people are able to make rational decisions to express their political will. Instead of carefully evaluating their political choices, people tend to focus on personal issues and merely express a general attitude when casting their votes.

Schumpeter suggests dropping the idea that people directly make political decisions. Instead it should be accepted that politicians make the decisions and people just vote for a politician (or political party) whose policy bundle best represents their interests. Politicians would have to compete for votes by addressing people’s needs in their programmes. Unlike in Classical Theory, the roles of citizens and politicians are supposed to be defined way more realistic in this framework.

Sources:

Schumpeter, J. (1978): Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Fifth edition, London

The notion of liberal democracy consists of two components- one, “democracy”, referring to a political process, and the other, “liberal”, referring to a political outcome. The argument that it is a contradictory notion lies in the fact that to presuppose or predefine politcal outcomes as liberal (consistent with liberal principles of individual autonomy, freedom from coercion, and equal and inherant rights) appears incompatible with the political process of democracy- under its literal definition meaning “rule of the people”. There is no apparant reason why the “rule of the people” will necessarily produce a society which is liberal. Might the people not instead choose illiberal political outcomes? Indeed, empirical analysis of political systems around the world suggests that illiberal democracy is the reality of many of them. However, an examination of some of the prominent theories of democracy reveals common liberalist themes running through the various definitions of, and justifications for, democracy. Theories of democracy as a system of balance are those that come closest to recognising the potential contradiction in the notion of liberal democracy- arguing that democratic rule must be underpinned by constitutionally protected bodies of rights in order to ensure desirable political outcomes. Clearly, understandings of the notion of democracy itself are crucial to the question of whether liberal democracy is a contradictory notion. Another crucial question is how the notion is used. If used as a descriptive term, it would appear entirely valid- many political systems may reasonably be described as liberal democracies. If however the notion is used prescriptively, at once prescribing a political outcome (liberalism),  and a political process by which the “people” decide outcomes, the inherant contradiction is more clear.

Zakaria’s 1997 article The Rise Of Illiberal Democracy highlighted a significant trend evident during the widespread processes of democratisation which had swept the world over the previous half century. In many cases democratisation of political sytems had not been accompanied by liberalisation of those societies. Freedom House’s most recent Freedom In The World survey (2011), which identified 115 “electoral democracies” but classified less than 80 states as “free” based on the civil liberties offered to their populations, suggests this remains the case. So, whilst in the West democracy has long been held to equate to liberal democracy, in much of the rest of the world the relationship between democracy and liberal outcomes appears far less certain.

Nevertheless, many democratic political sytems can, as Freedom House’s survey attests, reasonably be described as liberal democracies. Democracy in itself is of course a complex notion, but an analysis of several prominent democratic theories would suggest that liberalist themes run central to the conceptualisation of, and functioning of, democracy. Central to Dahl’s theory of democracy are key liberal assumptions such as that of “intrinsic equality” and of “personal autonomy”. Freedom- both to compete for, and to choose government- is at the core of Schumpeter’s theory of democracy as competition. And the model of a consolidated democracy which Linz and Stepan develop broadly resembles a liberal society- with autonomy in civil, political and economic society, supported by the rule of law, identified as vital ingredients of a consolidated democracy. On the basis of these theories there would appear to be a close association, rather than a contradiction, between the principles of liberalism and the democratic process. It could then perhap be argued that “illiberal democracies” represent flawed democracies, rather than instances where illiberal outcomes are the legitimate product of democratic processes.

Theories of democracy as a system of balance come closest to acknowledging the contradiction between a preference for the “rule of the people” and the desirability of liberal political outcomes. The primary representation of such theories in action is in the design of the US political system- a system of checks and balances designed to limit power, central to which is the existence of a comprehensive body of individual rights which is constitutionally protected so as to ensure that liberal political outcomes are not jeopardised by majority rule or the actions of political elites. The question is, does this system represent “democracy” or is it in fact the embodiment of liberal democracy’s inherant contradiction, in that to ensure the “rule of the people” produces liberal outcomes the “rule of the people” is restricted so that they are not actually fully in control of political outcomes?

Whether liberal democracy is an inherantly contradictory notion or not appears therefore to rest on how exactly democracy is defined. If it is accepted that, as in the US political system, democracy is a political process underpinned by a constitutional body of rights, then there is nothing contradictory about the notion of liberal democracy. In fact, if the constitution is a liberal one, then democracy is liberal democracy. However, if on the other hand democracy is conceived solely as a process by which the people govern, or choose their government, then the answer is rather different. Then, if the notion of liberal democracy is, as is common in the contemporary world’s ideological climate, used as a prescriptive term- to prescribe the form a political system should take- then it is inherantly contradictory, as it entails prescribing a political process by which people rule whilst at the same time prescribing the outcomes which are available to them (liberalism). But, as a descriptive term, the notion has more legitimacy- as there are many political systems which may fairly uncontroversially described as liberal democracies. Where the danger, and the contradiction, lies is in the assumption that all democracies equate to liberal democracies. As we have seen, this is far from clear.

It is then difficult to give a concise answer as to whether the notion of liberal democracy is inherantly contradictory or not. From one point of view, the contradiction is clear. “Democracy” refers to a political process by which the “people” are able to rule, yet the “liberal” component of the notion refers to a political outcome, thus dictating the outcome of the supposedly “democratic” process. The existence of “illiberal democracies” would appear to demonstrate that if allowed to rule, the people may just as readily choose illiberal political outcomes. On the other hand, examination of prominent theretical analyses of democracy reveals close associations between democratic theory and liberal principles of autonomy, equality and individual rights. Significantly though, theories of democracy as a system of balance recognise that unconstrained democratic processes can produce illiberal outcomes, and prescribe a constitution underpinning those processes in order to ensure desirable (liberal) outcomes. The question is whether such a system can truly be considered democracy, or if it restricts the democratic process to the extent that it is compromised. Given the complexities of these issues, it is clear that caution should be exercised in the use of the notion of liberal democracy. As a description of an empirical reality it has much validity. As a prescriptive term on the other hand, whether it is inherantly contradictory depends on what assumptions are made on the nature of democracy itself.

Dahl starts with differentiating democracy against anarchism. He defines anarchism as basing on four assumptions (Dahl 1989, 39ff):

1. No one is obligated to support a bad state.
2. All states are coercive.
3. Coercion is intrinsically bad.
4. A society without a state is a feasible alternative to a society with a state.

Following from the assumptions he draws five conclusions that would explain the need for anarchism (41f):

1. Because all states are necessarily coercive, all states are necessarily bad.
2. Because all states are necessarily bad, no one has an obligation to obey or support any state.
3. Because [1 and 2 hold true], and because a society without a state is a feasible alternative, all states ought to be abolished.
4. A democratic state is still a state, still coercive, and still bad, [if it just provides procedures for inherently bad coerciveness].
5. Because the requirement of unanimity would prevent coercion, […] a democratic process would be justified if it were to require unanimity. But since a unanimity requirement would guarantee that no one could ever be coerced, an association in which [all] decisions were made by unanimity would not be a state.

He then shows why the assumptions and thus the conclusions are wrong or unsatisfactory:

On coercion (45f):

• If coercion is intrinsically bad but might be accepted for sufficiently good purposes, one might justifiably argue to create a democratic state in order to maximise other values like freedom, equality, security, and justice.
• If coercion is absolutely forbidden but likely to be employed by wrongdoers, then the argument is self-contradictory. Either one permits the wrongdoers to coerce others or one has to use coercion to stop wrongdoers from doing so.

On the need for a state (46f):

• It is empirically not plausible that humans can live together in large groups in harmony in a stateless society.
• Nearly all area of the world is covered by states, thus there is not enough space to live somewhere autonomously without a state.
• Therefore “it would be better to try to create a satisfactory state than try to exist in a society without state”.

In his critique of anarchism, Dahl also addresses Robert Paul Wolff’s defence of anarchism and shows that his arguments are self-contradictory.
In his summary, Dahl points out that there will always be coercion and the need to build a state. He believes that the “best possible state would be one that minimizes coercion and maximizes consent, within limits set by historical conditions and the pursuit of other values, including happiness, freedom, and justice” (57). In his view, this state would be a democratic state.

Dahl continues with defending democracy against what he calls “guardianship”. He defines guardianship as the idea that a small minority of persons “who are specially qualified to govern by reason of their superior knowledge and virtue” should govern the rest (52).
In Dahl’s view, guardianship rests on a couple of propositions that are difficult to justify. If a small minority of persons should be more qualified to govern due to their knowledge, this implies that a) there exists an objective, absolutely true science of governing that b) can only be acquired by some people (65f). If either a) or b) is false, the entire proposition is false.
Said knowledge to govern can either be moral knowledge or instrumental knowledge (66ff). However, most people would agree that absolute moral truth and thus an objectively true moral knowledge of government do not exists. As for instrumental knowledge, it is difficult to argue why this knowledge could only be acquired by a small minority of people.
Dahl sets as given that a good government – no matter if democratic or guardianship – acts in accordance with the public good. This leads to the following problem: Even if one assumed that there indeed exists a class of guardians with superior knowledge, these guardians would still need to find out about the public good. Dahl argues that one needs a satisfactory principle to distinguish the general good from individual interests. In his view, this principle would be democracy (74).
While for Dahl it is highly doubtful that guardians would possess superior knowledge, one might still argue that they have higher virtue. An advocate of guardianship might for example argue that guardians are no more likely to abuse their power than democratically elected officials to whom authority has been delegated. However, in guardianship, authority is alienated from the people and not delegated to the guardians. Guardians thus face an agency-conflict because they do not need to justify themselves for their action towards the people who have “lent” the authority (76).
Dahl also mentions that absolute power tends to corrupt people, but also admits that this is rather a general judgement than a valid “law” (76).
Eventually, historical experience also does not support guardianship. If one would use a “maximin” decision-making strategy to choose a political system, thus a system that is best in its worst outcome, a bad democracy leaves the people better off than a bad authoritarian regime (e.g. like the authoritarian regimes in the first half of the 20^th century). The same holds true for a maximax strategy, because in its ideal outcomes democracy and guardianship would just differ in the freedom of ordinary people to participate in making political decisions. Although both ideal systems would always make the right decisions, democracy would give people the freedom of participation, while guardianship would not. Consequently, democracy would be better (78f).

Sources:
Dahl, Robert A. (1989): Democracy and its critics. New Haven and London: Yale University Press

Mistrust of the government

A major trend that has been visible in many of the largest First World democracies is the growing mistrust of the government. While in the 1950’s three out of four US Americans would say that they trust in their government to do the right things, this number has declined to just about 40% in 2004 (Wilson/DiIulio 2007). This corresponds with the increasing belief of American citizens that the political system is unlikely to respond to their needs and beliefs. Political scientists measure this in the political efficacy. Political efficacy consists of two parts:

1. Internal efficacy – the belief that to be able to understand and take part in politics
2. External efficacy – the belief that the system will respond to the citizens

While most studies show now significant change in Internal efficacy in the United States, external efficacy steadily has been steadily declining since the mid-1960’s (Wilson/Dilulio 2007).

… to be continued… I appreciate any suggestions on a) stats on the same topic in Europe and b) further trends in people’s orientation towards politics.

Sources:

Wilson, J. / Dilulio, J. (2007): American Government: Institutions and Policies. Florence: Wadsworth Publishing

Examples of consolidated democracies are the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. These democracies have well-established political systems. The most important features of the systems are specified in the states’ constitutions and have not been widely changed for decades.

Examples of non-consolidated democracies might include Afghanistan, Kazakhstan and the Thailand. First of all, one might question if these states are de facto democracies after all (especially Afghanistan).

According to Linz and Stepan (1996), consolidated and non-consolidated democracies differ in the degree in which they achieve the following five criteria:

1. In civil society, there has to be freedom of association and communication
2. In political society, there has to be free and inclusive electoral contestation.
3. There must be a rule of law and a spirit of constitutionalism.
4. The state apparatus has to be fun, according to legal-rational (Weberian) bureaucratic principles.
5. Economic society has to be organised around respect for property rights, and conditions must be in place to permit economic growth.

It is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to fully achieve all five criteria. Therefore, states are also considered “consolidated” when they mostly achieve the criteria. For example, there are (weakening) secessionist tendencies in Great Britain (the IRA wants Northern Ireland to become a part of Ireland), the recent London riots deeply contrast a “rule of law and a spirit of constitutionalism” and economic property rights, and in the Southern parts of the United States black citizens have lacked full support of the judicial system for a long time. However, only very little people would consider Great Britain and the United States undemocratic (or not fully consolidated).
While it is subject of debate where one should draw the threshold between consolidated and non-consolidated democracies, the given examples are among the best scoring (USA, Germany, UK) and the worst scoring states (Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Thailand) according to above criteria. One might therefore reasonably distinguish them as consolidated and non-consolidated democracies.

Sources:

Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996): Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press

1. 1.       write a short paragraph outlining who has put it forward
2. 2.       state the key element of the definition
3. 3.       state any objections that could be made to it.

 
Max Weber:
Max Weber describes legitimacy in terms of the citizens’ willingness to obey the commands of the rulers (“Legitimitätsglaube”). Weber defines three sources of legitimacy: (1) Tradition – the system has been there for a long time and is not questioned, (2) charisma of the leader and (3) legality (trust in the justness of the law).
As a criticism it is often stated that Weber’s concept disregards any normative evaluation, although legitimacy is per definitionem a normative concept. Instead, Weber is said to describe political stability (e.g. Mommsen 1974, Friedrich 1963).

Seymour Martin Lipset:
Seymour Martin Lipset defines legitimacy as the ‘capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society’ (Lipset 1981). Lipset thereby distinguishes between actual performance (‘effectiveness’) and perceived performance.
As one criticism one might argue that Lipset’s definition is not stable over time: A populist and ineffective government might have been considered legitimate by misleading its people during its rule. However, after they realize the ineffectiveness they might consider it illegitimate in retrospective.
… to be continued

Sources:
Friedrich, C.J.  (1963): Man and his Government. New York
Mommsen, W. (1974): The Age of Bureaucracy. Oxford
Lipset, S.M. (1981): Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Baltimore

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia, social institutions are commonly understood as sets of rules and norms that organise human activities within a society. Following that definition, political institutions could be defined as sets of rules and norms that organise political activity.
Institutions do not necessarily have to be written down, but they have to be enforced or commonly accepted (or both). In a narrower meaning, “political institutions” also describe the organisations that shape the actions within a political system, such as parties, courts, trade unions, etc.

Activity 1.2: ‘There is no point in analysing political systems by the formal rules that apply unless these rules actually mean something to the people.’ Discuss, with examples.

If any level of political analysis exists that can draw conclusions from unaccepted formal rules, it could make sense to study those rules.  In reverse: Above statement “There is no point …” only holds true, when no such level of analysis exists. This is not the case.

First, the degree to which formal rules are valued might be used to evaluate the degree of legitimation of a political system. Rules and laws should be the result of a societal consent.
If a large quantity of citizens does not agree with some of the laws, these laws are either outdated (and have been failed to be revised) or have not been the result of a consent in the first place. In either case one might say that the rules are illegitimate. Good examples are the restrictions of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly in Egypt, Tunisian, and Syria that increased dissatisfaction with the political systems and eventually led to the disestablishment of the Tunisian and Egyptian government.

Second, the acceptance of formal rules might also say something about the effectiveness of a political system. For instance, the fact that up to 50% of citizens in some Latin American countries ignore their tax liabilities might be a good indicator for the overall effectiveness of the systems. In consequence this also explains fiscal difficulties in these countries.

Third, the existence of unaccepted formal rules might also point out to issues that should be discussed and changed by the political actors. Examples are the copyright laws for digital contents that are generally ignored by significant parts of the populations in many states. This might suggest that law makers in those countries have not yet managed to cope with new information systems.
Another example is the prohibition of online gambling in Germany. This law is routinely ignored by millions of Germans who play poker or do sports betting online without any fear of persecution. The main consequence of the law is that all gambling platforms have their seat in foreign countries, where they are out of reach of the German judicial system. Eventually, ban of online gambling therefore even decreases the possibilities of German political actors to manage the problem.

In conclusion it should have become apparent that there is a point in analysing political systems also by the rules that do not mean anything to the people.

Activity 1.3: What potential advantages are there in studying political institutions from a cultural perspective?

Political culture is commonly understood as the view of a nation’s citizens towards politics. It affects their perceptions of political legitimacy. Ideally, the political culture underpins the legitimacy of a political system, thereby encouraging people to accept the enforcement of law and shaping the political institutions to most precisely match their specific needs.

When political culture is understood as the view of a nation’s citizens towards politics, this implies that studying institutions from a cultural perspective means to adapt the perspective of the citizens. This might be very helpful to understand why some institutions are more accepted than others. From this understanding one could draw conclusions how to make institutions more accepted and thereby (hopefully) more effective. As an example, if I consider the tax rules and the fiscal authorities to be legitimate, I might be more likely to pay my tax liabilities.

Studying institutions from a cultural perspective may also help not just to understand the institutions, but to understand the culture itself. The University of Copenhagen describes the connection quite well in the syllabus of one of its courses:

“They are also, eo ipso, inherent carriers and producers of cultural histories, “local knowledge”, civilisational assumptions, and identitarian trajectories at both national and regional levels – manifestations, in other words, of often very different political cultures. They embody specific visions of what constitutes the good life, the right kind of morality, and the most appropriate forms of education and socialization in any given social order. Whether we think of governments, judicial or electoral systems, public bureaucracies, social welfare institutions, environmental policies, or educational organizations, they all act as “path-dependent” caretakers of socially desirable identities, rights and duties, worldviews, and interactions between citizens and state.”